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By looking at how an East Asian currency moves when the yen fluctuates sharply against the
US dollar, we sometimes find that the reaction has been much more significant than would be
suggested by the econometric estimates of the weight of the yen in nominal exchange rate
determination, Moreover, the Korean won and the Malaysian ringgit have tended to move more
closely with a depreciating yen, suggesting the countries’ emphasis on export promotion. The
Singapore dollar, on the other hand, has tended to move more closely with an appreciating yen,
underscoring the importance attached to price stability. The paper concludes that, given the trend
appreciation of the yen during the recent past, emphasis on price stability has contributed more to








There has recently been a marked increase in real economic integration
among the Asian countries. For example, the share of intra-regional trade
in the total exports of Asia (which excludes Japan) rose from 30.9 percent
in 1986 to 45.7 percent in 1994, while the share of exports to the United
States (US) declined from 34.0 to 24.5 percent during the same period (Kwan
1995) . In the rapidly industrializing economies of Asia, the share of Japan
is now considerably larger than that of the US in imports, although not in
exports (Table 1). Japan is at least equal in importance to the US as a
trading partner of most Asian countries.
Despite the increasing pace of intra-regional integration, the
declining share of the US in international trade, and the significant status
of Japan as a trading partner, the exchange rate policies of most East Asian
countries remain that of limiting fluctuations in the nominal values of
their currencies relative to the US dollar in one form or another. Most
empirical studies as well as casual observation seem to suggest that the US
dollar remains strong, and the Japanese yen remains marginal, as the anchor
of the exchange rate policies in the region.
Against this background, the paper will examine the role of the
Japanese yen in the exchange rate policies of selected Asian countries,l
namely, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.
This is not a new topic. The well-cited study of Frankel and Wei (1994),
for example, has examined this very issue by econometrically estimating the
implicit weights of the US dollar and the Japanese yen in the determination
of the nominal values of major Asian currencies. The present study is meant2
to complement
by taking the
the empirical findings obtained from the econometric approach
alternative approach of observing the currency
the Japanese yen fluctuates sharply in one direction against
To be sure, the monetary authorities of Asian countries





their exchange rate policies, such as price stability, stability of nominal
effective exchange rate indices, stability of real effective exchange rate
indices, encouragement or discouragement of capital flows, accumulation of
foreign exchange resemes, or export promotion. Then, the role of the yen
in the exchange rate policy of a given country cannot be independent of the
domestic and international environments within which the authorities are
forced to operate. In this context, it is important to bear in mind that,
during the past 15 years or so, the yen significantly appreciated against
the US dollar in both nominal and real terms (Table 2). Under this
environment, the decision to minimize its fluctuations against the yen would
have meant that the authorities must accept some appreciation of their
currency against the US dollar and the other Asian currencies.
If a large weight is given to export promotion in the objective
function of the authorities, they may have been reluctant to tie their
currency too closely with the appreciating yen, to the extent that nominal
currency appreciation may work to reduce the growth of exports in the short
run. Then, ex Dost, the currency in question must have moved closely with
the US dollar and depreciated against the yen, such that its relationship
with the yen may be characterized as “competitive” in that, relative to the
yen, exchange rate stability was willingly sacrificed in favor of
depreciation to preserve competitiveness.3
On the other hand, if a large weight is given to price stability, the
authorities may have been less willing to tolerate accepting nominal
depreciation and hence higher domestic inflation, by tying the currency too
closely to the US dollar. This may be a particularly pertinent
consideration, given the significant share of Japanese goods in total
imports . In this case, ex Post, the currency in question must have moved
with the yen and appreciated against the US dollar to a greater extent, and
its relationship with the yen may be regarded as “cooperative”, in that such
behavior has tended to contribute to monetary cooperation in Asia by
promoting greater exchange rate stability in the environment of secular yen
appreciation.
Occasionally, however, the yen did depreciate against the US dollar on
a sustained basis. On such occasions, the considerations of export
promotion and price stability would have created exactly the opposite kind
of reaction to the yen’s fluctuation on the part of the monetary





been more willing to allow the currency concerned to depreciate
the yen against the US dollar. With more emphasis on price
they would have been more unwilling to allow the currency to
along with the yen. Thus , in the case of yen depreciation,
export promotion would have encouraged greater exchange rate stability
within Asia. However, throughout this paper, emphasis on price stability is
regarded as “cooperative” behavior because, for the period taken as a whole,
it has contributed more to promoting exchange rate stability within Asia.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the
exchange rate arrangements of the six Asian countries, with some comments on
the nominal and real exchange rate movements. Section 111 summarizes the4
econometric estimates of the implicit weights of the US dollar and the
Japanese yen in the determination of the nominal values of the currencies of
the six Asian countries, as reported by Frankel and Wei (1994) and the more
recent study of Kwan (1995). Section IV provides an additional insight into
the relative weights of the US dollar and the Japanese yen in the
determination of the values of the six Asian currencies by looking at how
they move when the yen fluctuates sharply against the dollar. Sections V
and VI take a look at the daily movements of the six Asian currencies during
the periods of sharp yen appreciation or depreciation in the late 1980s and
in 1995, respectively, in order to assess the response of the monetary
authorities when the yen fluctuates sharply against the US dollar. Section
VII presents concluding remarks.
II. An Overview of the Exchange Rate Arrangements and Movements of Selected
Asian Countries
At the outset, it may be useful to review briefly the exchange rate
arrangements of the six individual countries. According to official
statements (IMF 1994), Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia are
classified as maintaining “other managed floating”, while Thailand maintains
a peg to a currency composite, or a currency basket. Of the six countries,
only the Philippines is classified as maintaining a floating exchange rate
system. In practice, however, Indonesia and the Philippines are similar in
that the rupiah and the peso are both managed tightly in terms of their US
dollar exchange rates over a short time horizon, while they have shown
significant trend depreciation over a longer horizon (Table 2); their
exchange rate system may more appropriately be classified as a crawling peg
to the dollar.5
Consistent with the crawling peg arrangement, both the Indonesian
rupiah and the Philippine peso depreciated significantly against the US
dollar in nominal terms over the period from 1980 to 1995: the rupiah
depreciated from 627 to 2249 units per US dollar, and the peso moved from
7.51 to 25.71 units per US dollar, both on an annual average basis. In
contrast, the other currencies showed relative stability against the US
dollar’over this period. The Korean won first depreciated from 607.43 to
881.45 units per US dollar between 1980 and 1986, but then appreciated to
671.46 units per US dollar in 1989. The Singapore dollar showed a fairly
steady appreciation against the US dollar, rising from 2.14 to 1.42 units
per US dollar between 1980 and 1995. The Malaysian ringgit and the Thai
baht depreciated at a modest pace against the US dollar, with the ringgit
falling from 2.18 to 2.50 units per US dollar and the baht from 20.4S to
24.80 units per US dollar over the period.
In real bilateral terms (on a wholesale price basis), the Korean won,
the Singapore dollar, the Malaysian ringgit and the Indonesian rupiah
generally depreciated against both the US dollar and the
the period, although they became much more stable during
the period (Table 2). The Philippine peso, in contrast,
Japanese yen over
the latter part of
appreciated in real
terms against the US dollar, although it depreciated against the Japanese
yen over the period. Reflecting the higher rate of inflation, it even
appreciated against
significant nominal
against both the US
(1) Korea
the Japanese yen from 1988 to 1990 despite the
depreciation. Finally, the Thai baht appreciated
dollar and the Japanese yen over the period.
From February 1980 to March 1990, the won was officially linked to a
basket of currencies, although it was effectively pegged to the US dollar,6
On March 2, 1990, however, the Korean authorities adopted the so-called
market average rate (MAR) system, by which the dollar exchange rate is in
principle determined by supply and demand conditions in the market, subject
to a type of daily price limit. The Bank of Korea sets the won/dollar rate
on the basis of a weighted average of interbank rates for spot transactions
of the previous day. On each business day, the won\dollar exchange rate in
the interbank market is allowed to fluctuate within fixed margins
(currently, one percent on either side) against the MAR of the previous day.
The real exchange rates of the Korean won against the US dollar and the
Japanese yen closely followed the nominal exchange rates because the rate of
inflation only slightly exceeded those in the US and Japan. Over the period
1980-95, the Korean won depreciated against both the US dollar and the
Japanese yen, naturally with the extent of depreciation against the yen
being much more significant. From 1990 to 1994, although the won remained
relatively stable against the dollar, it depreciated by as much as 34
percent against the yen. From 1994 to 1995, however, it marginally
appreciated against the yen.
(2) Singapore
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) “monitors the external value
of the Singapore dollar against a trade-weighted basket of currencies, with
the objective of promoting noninflationary sustainable economic growth” (IMF
1994) . In Singapore, the central bank functions are performed by the Board
of Commissioners of Currency (Currency Board) and the MS. The Currency
Board issues and redeems currency notes and coins, as demanded and backed by
foreign assets. The MAS intervenes in the foreign exchange market whenever
the exchange rate is out of line with the undisclosed target, which may well
be changed from time to time. Given the openness and the small size of the7
economy, price stability is paramount as an objective of exchange rate
policy (Toh 1996).2
In real terms, the Singapore dollar depreciated against both the US
dollar and the Japanese yen over the entire period of 1980-95. From 1986 to
1990, however, the Singapore dollar appreciated against both currencies.
From 1990 to 1994, it depreciated against the yen by almost 30 percent,
while it remained stable against the US dollar; from 1994 to 1995, it
marginally appreciated against the yen. Judging from the behavior of the
real exchange rate, it appears that, from about 1986, price stability became
a particularly important objective of Singapore’s exchange rate policy.
(3) Malaysia
From September 1975, the value of the ringgit has been determined by
supply and demand conditions in the foreign exchange market by Bank Nagara
Malaysia with a reference to the value determined by a basket of the
currencies of the country’s major trading partners. According to the IMF
(1994), the central bank is said to intervene “only to maintain orderly
market conditions and to avoid excessive fluctuations in the value of the
ringgit”.
In real terms, the ringgit depreciated against both the US dollar and
the Japanese yen over the entire sample period. The depreciation was
particularly substantial against the yen. From 1990, however, the ringgit
began to appreciate moderately against the US dollar, in line with its
nominal appreciation. However, it continued to depreciate against the yen
until 1994, when it began to appreciate somewhat.
(4) Indonesia
With the devaluation of the rupiah in November 1978, the link with the
US dollar was discontinued, and the middle rate of the rupiah began to be8
determined by the value of a basket of currencies and other considerations,
subject to periodic devaluations. Following the 45-percent devaluation of
September 1986, however, Bank Indonesia
maintaining the real effective exchange
maintain Indonesia’s competitiveness in
inflation relative to its major trading
to 1994, the rupiah thus depreciated at
the US dollar per year in nominal terms.
launched the exchange rate policy of
rate at a stable level in order to
the light of higher domestic
partners (Goelton 1996). From 1986
a rate of roughly 5 percent against
Bank Indonesia continues to set the middle or reference rate of the
rupiah in terms of the US dollar by taking into account the behavior of a
basket of currencies of Indonesia’s major trading partners. In September
1994, however, Bank Indonesia ceased to announce the middle rate and at the
same time began to widen the intervention band around the middle rate in
order to increase the risk of speculation in the rupiah. Currently, the
intervention bank is approximately 3 percent on either side of the now
undisclosed reference rate against the US dollar.
Although the Indonesian rupiah depreciated against both the US dollar
and the Japanese yen over the entire period in real terms, it remained much
more stable after 1986 in line with the stated objective of the exchange
rate policy. In fact, it appreciated in real terms against the US dollar by
about 20 percent from 1990 to 1995, while it depreciated against the yen by
about 13 percent, indicating that the Indonesian authorities are concerned
about the stability of the real effective exchange rate of the rupiah, in
which the yen must have significant weight.
(5) Philippines
Prior to October 1984, the Central Bank had intervened to keep the
peso/dollar exchange rate within a certain target range. Since then, the9
value of the peso has in principle been determined freely in the foreign
exchange market, though it is apparent that the central bank controls short-
run fluctuations in the exchange rate. With the major liberalization of the
foreign exchange market in 1992, there is presumably a greater role of
market forces in the determination of the exchange rate.
Reflecting the much higher and variable rate of inflation in the
Philippines as well as the frequency of changes in the target dollar
exchange rate, the real exchange rate of the Philippine peso fluctuated
greatly against the US dollar and the Japanese yen. From 1990 to 1995, the
peso depreciated against the yen by over 14 percent, while it appreciated
against the US dollar by nearly 18 percent in real terms. It is possible
that, to the extent that the Philippine authorities have allowed the peso to
appreciate substantially against the US dollar in real terms, they are
paying some attention to the real effective exchange rate, in which the yen
has significant weight.
(6) Thailand
The Thai baht was de facto pegged to the US dollar from 1981 to
November 1984, when it was devalued by 14.7 percent. The baht was
subsequently pegged to a weighted basket of currencies of Thailand’s major
trading partners. The basket is not disclosed, nor is the frequency with
which the basket is changed. It is believed, however, that the weight of
the US dollar was raised from about 50 percent to over 80 percent when the
US dollar began to depreciate sharply against major currencies from late
1985 (Leeahtam 1991).
In the morning of every business day, the Bank of Thailand announces
the central rates of major currencies against the baht. For the US dollar,
the buying and selling rates are two satang below and above the central10
rate . In a recent meeting of the Exchange Equalization Fund, however, the
Governor of the Bank of Thailand is reported to have announced the
possibility of widening the band from current two satang to four satang on
either side of the central rate, in order to discourage short-term
speculative capital inflows by increasing the cost of investing in the baht
(Phatra Research Institute 1996).
In real terms, the Thai baht remained fairly stable against the US
dollar from 1980 to 1985, but it began to appreciate sharply from 1985, when
the yen began to appreciate against the US dollar. In contrast, while the
baht appreciated against the yen during the earlier period in real terms
(reflective of the fact that it was pegged to the appreciating dollar), it
remained fairly stable against the yen in real terms from 1986 to 1995. As
a result, from 1990 to 1995, the baht appreciated against the US dollar by
nearly 30 percent.
III. The Implicit Weights of the US Dollar and the Japanese Yen: A Review of
Frankel and Wei (1994) and Kwan (1995)
The well-cited study of Frankel and Wei (1994) was the first to
estimate econometrically the implicit weights of the US dollar and the
Japanese yen in the determination of the nominal values of qajor Asian
currencies during the period of 1979-92. This study was replicated by Kwan
(1995) on the basis of more recent data. Their major findings are
summarized in Table 3, which seem to show that dominant weight is given to
the US dollar in the determination of all of the six Asian currencies. 3
According to Frankel and Wei (1994), however, the weight of the yen,
although small, was significant in the Singapore dollar and became larger in
the Malaysian ringgit and the Thai baht during the latest subperiod of 1991-11
92 (not reported in the table). The recently increased weight of the yen is
reported by Kwan (1995) for the Korean won, the Singapore dollar, the
Malaysian ringgit and the Thai baht.
(1) Korea
According to the estimates of Frankel and Wei (1994) based on weekly
data for the period of January 1979-May 1992, the share of the US dollar in
the determination of the Korean won was 0.96 while the share of the Japanese
yen was practically zero. In fact, they show that the Korean won remained
linked more or less to the US dollar even after the introduction of the MAR
system in March 1990. This finding is confirmed for the later period of
January 1991-May 1995 by Kwan (1995) on the basis of monthly data. However,
Kwan reports that, for the most recent subperiod of January-August 1995, the
weight of the dollar declined to 0.8374, while that of the yen increased to
0.1737.
(2) Singapore
According to Frankel and Wei (1994), the Singapore dollar was the only
Asian currency that consistently assigned weight to the yen throughout the
entire period of 1979-92. The weight of the dollar was 0.75, while that of
the yen was 0.13, when the weights were calculated for the entire sample.
They also show that the weight of the yen doubled in the 1980s from around 5
percent to 10 percent, or from 10 percent to 20 percent, depending on the
method of estimation (not reported in the table). For the most recent
period, Kwan (1995) reports that the weight of the US dollar was 0.7459,
while that of the yen was 0.1835.
(3) Malaysia
According to Frankel and Wei (1994), the weight of the yen in the
Malaysian ringgit was extremely small in the early 1980s, and even12
disappeared during the rest of the 1980s, but increased to about 14 percent
in the early 1990s (not reported in the table). For the entire period, the
weight of the yen was 0.07, while that of the dollar was 0.78. For the
later subperiod of January 1991-May 1995, however, Kwan (1995) assigns
virtually zero weight to the yen (0.0431), while greater weight is given to
the US dollar (0.8411). For the most recent subperiod of




the US dollar was
Frankel and Wei (1994) report that, although the Indonesian rupiah
remained tightly pegged to the US dollar until 1982, the dollar peg became
looser in 1983. In 1985, the yen received significant weight, so much so
that the weight exceeded that of the US dollar for the period 1985-86 (not
reported in the table). Subsequently, however, the weight of the yen
declined, disappearing altogether during the latest subperiod of 1991-92
(not reported in the table). For the entire sample period, the weights of
the US dollar and the Japanese yen were estimated to be 0.95 and 0.16,
respectively. The insignificant weight of the yen in more recent years is
confirmed by Kwan (1995) for the subperiod of January 1991-May 1995 as well
as for the subperiod of January-August 1995.
(5) Philippines
Although the peso depreciated significantly against the US dollar
throughout the period in nominal terms, the estimated weight of the US




that, although the peso was devalued from time to
against the US dollar were strictly managed over13
(6) Thailand
Until 1984, the Thai baht was de facto linked to the US dollar, so that
the yen received no weight prior to that year. When the baht was delinked
from the dollar, however, the yen began to receive some weight which,
according to Frankel and Wei (1994), was in the neighborhood of 10 percent
during 1985-86 when the nominal value of the US dollar was at its peak (not
reported in the table). The weight of the yen became smaller during 1987-
90, but rose again to 12 percent during the latest subperiod of 1991-92 (not
reported in the table). For the entire sample, the weights of the US dollar
and the Japanese yen were 0.91 and 0.05, respectively. For the more recent
subperiod of January 1991-May 1995, Kwan (1995) reports 0.8202 and 0.1051 as
the weights of the US dollar and the yen, respectively.
IV. Movements of Asian Currencies When the Yen Fluctuates Sharply against
the US Dollar
While econometric estimation of the implicit weights of the US dollar
and the Japanese yen is useful in revealing the relative covariances of the
currency in question with the US dollar and the Japanese yen during a
particular sample period, it can yield misleading interpretations unless
proper caution is exercised. Most importantly, it must be borne in mind
that the econometric approach stresses the covariances between the currency
in question and the currencies included in the currency basket without much
regard to the magnitude of the underlying changes in currency values. This
point is important even if the currency in question is strictly pegged to a
currency basket (i.e. , Thailand) and the composition of the basket remains
unchanged, as long as a fluctuation margin is provided around the central
rate (Takagi 1988). Naturally, the problem becomes greater in the case of a14
managed float of more discretionary nature (i.e., Korea, Singapore and
Malaysia).
To understand this point, assume, for example, that the authorities of
a country care deeply about the nominal stability of the currency against
the Japanese yen and hence assigns a weight of 10 percent to the yen in the
currency basket. If the yen is relatively stable against the US dollar,
however, stability against the yen can be secured by simply pegging the
currency to the US dollar, presumably the intervention currency, as long as
the market rate remains within the prescribed margins around the theoretical
rate. Then, the estimated weight of the yen may turn out to be zero.
On the other hand, if the yen sharply fluctuates against the US dollar
in one direction, the policy of pegging the currency to the dollar will
result in a sharp movement of the currency against the Japanese yen and may
lead to a situation where the market rate goes out of the prescribed margins
unless the market rate is changed in line with the weight of the yen in the
country’s exchange rate policy. The authorities will likely change the
dollar rate so as to offset part of the fluctuations of the currency against
the yen, In this case, the estimated weight of the yen may approach the
theoretical value of 10 percent, or even higher if the qaximum margin on
both sides is utilized.
Thus , in order to assess the role of the Japanese yen in the exchange
rate policies of the Asian countries, it is important not only to look at
the econometric estimates of the weights of the dollar and the yen over some
sample period but also to examine how the currencies move vis-a-vis the
dollar and the yen, when the yen fluctuates sharply in one direction against
the US dollar. For this purpose, we will next consider 12 episodes of large
yen appreciation or depreciation (of at least 5 percent) against the US15
dollar. There were 8 episodes of yen appreciation and 4 episodes of yen
depreciation, Table 4 shows how much the Japanese yen and the other Asian
currencies appreciated (when the figures are positive) or depreciated (when
negative) against the US dollar during each of these 12 episodes.
The figures in parentheses indicate the direction of change of each
Asian currency as a percent of the movement of the Japanese yen, which can
be roughly interpreted as the weight of the yen during that episode.4 For
example, a negative figure in a parenthesis means that the movement of the
yen and the movement of the currency in question are opposite of each other
relative to the US dollar; a figure of 20, for example, means that the
magnitude of the movement of the currency in question is 20 percent of the
movement of the yen against the US dollar.
(1) Korea
When the episodes of yen appreciation or depreciation during 1982-95
are individually examined, we find that, when the yen depreciated, the won
always depreciated against the US dollar three out of four times. The
weight of the yen during the yen’s depreciation ranged between 6 and 43
percent. On the other hand, when the yen appreciated against the US dollar,
there were times when the won even depreciated against the US dollar.
During the appreciation of the yen during December 1993-May 1995, however,
the won also appreciated against the US dollar, with the implicit weight of
the yen in the determination of the won corresponding to 20 percent.
(2) Singapore
When the currency value of the yen changed sharply against the US
dollar, the weight of the yen in the determination of the Singapore dollar
was consistently significant throughout the period, with the weight ranging
between 10 and 55 percent. However, there were two exceptions: the16
Singapore dollar appreciated against the US dollar by 4 percent during
September 1989-April 1990, when the yen depreciated by 13 percent; and it
remained stable against the US dollar during May 1995-September 1995, when
the yen depreciated by almost 17 percent.
(3) Malaysia
In terms of individual episodes, the weight of the yen in the
determination of the ringgit became consistently significant after the
episode of November 1986-April 1987. The weight ranged between 8 and 32
percent.
(4) Indonesia
The yen even had a negative weight during August 1985-September 1986,
meaning that the rupiah depreciated against the US dollar when the yen
significantly appreciated against the US dollar. The rupiah generally
depreciated against the US dollar whenever the yen depreciated against the
US dollar. The weight of the yen for the most recent episode (May-September
1995) was about 10 percent, but this may simply reflect the fact that the
yen depreciated against the US dollar when there was a trend depreciation of
the rupiah.
(5) Philippines
Consistent with the fact that the peso depreciated against the US
dollar in nominal terms during this period, the yen and the peso generally
moved in the same direction only when the yen depreciated against the US
dollar. The implicit weight of the yen becomes larger when the magnitude of
the yen’s movement against the US dollar is small. On the other hand, the
implicit weight becomes small (or negative) when the yen’s movement against
the dollar is large, indicating that the yen plays little role in the peso’s
nominal exchange rate determination.17
(6) Thailand
When the individual episodes are considered, it becomes clear that the
weight of the yen in the determination of the baht was between 7 and 19
percent during 1985-95. The order of magnitude of these implied weights is
similar to the econometrically estimated weights. Together with the fact
that the weight of the yen was apparently symmetrical with respect
appreciation and depreciation, this seems to suggest that the Thai
to
baht is
pegged fairly strictly to a basket of currencies, in which the weight of the
yen is stable.
V. The Daily Movements of Asian Currencies during the Periods of Sharp Yen
Appreciation and Depreciation in the 1980s5
In the first half of the 1980s, the yen/dollar exchange rate fluctuated
in the range of 200-270 yen per dollar, with the yen showing general
weakening against the dollar from the middle of 1984 through the early part
of 1985. Following the Plaza Agreement of September 22, 1985, however, the
yen began to appreciate sharply from the pre-Plaza level of around 240 to
reach the level of almost 200 yen per dollar in two months. The
appreciation of the yen, from September 19 to November 25, amounted to
almost 20 percent. The yen continued its trend appreciation throughout the
rest of the 1980s, except for one notable period of substantial reversal
from the latter part of
gradually than on other
120.9 yen per dollar on
1988 through the first part of 1989. Somewhat more
occasions, the yen depreciated from the high of
November 24, 1988 to the low of 149.6 yen per dollar
on June 15, 1989, a depreciation of almost 20 percent.
This section will take a detailed look at the daily movements of the
Japanese yen and the Asian currencies against the US dollar during the18
period immediately following the Plaza Agreement of 1985 (Figure I-A and
Figure l-B) and a portion of the latter period of yen depreciation, namely,
from January 3 to June 14, 1989 (Figure 2-A and Figure 2-B).
(1) Korea
During the first period when the yen was appreciating against the US
dollar, the Korean won remained virtually pegged to the dollar. During the
second period of sharp yen depreciation, the won moderately appreciated
against the dollar. In either period, there is no evidence to suggest that
the Korean authorities were paying much attention to the movement of the won
against the yen.
(2) Singapore
During the first period of sharp yen appreciation, the Singaporean
authorities allowed the Singapore dollar to appreciate along with the yen
against the US dollar. The cumulative appreciation of the Singapore dollar
over this period was almost 5 percent, as opposed to almost 20 percent for
the yen. In contrast, when the yen depreciated in the early part of 1989,
the Singapore dollar remained stable against the US dollar, underscoring the
importance the Singaporean authorities attach to price stability.
(3) Malaysia
During the period of yen appreciation, the Malaysian authorities
allowed the ringgit to appreciate moderately along with the yen against the
US dollar. In contrast, during the time of yen depreciation, the ringgit
initially depreciated somewhat, but subsequently appreciated marginally. On
both occasions, the movement of the ringgit was similar to that of the
Singapore dollar.
(4) Indonesia19
On the first occasion of yen appreciation, the Indonesian rupiah
remained stable against the US dollar, indicating that the rupiah was
effectively pegged to the US dollar over
depreciated in 1989, however, the rupiah
(5) The Philippines
this interval. When the yen
moderately depreciated.
On both occasions, the Philippine peso was virtually pegged to the US
dollar.
(6) Thailand
When the yen appreciated, the Thai authorities allowed the baht to
appreciate moderately along with the yen against the US dollar; when the yen
depreciated, they depreciated the baht slightly along with the yen against
the US dollar. From these two episodes, it appears that the Thai
authorities strictly adhered to a basket peg and that the weight of the yen
in the currency basket was reduced somewhat somewhere between 1985 and 1987
presumably in the light of the appreciating trend of the yen.
VI. The Daily Movements of Asian Currencies during the Periods of Sharp Yen
Appreciation and Depreciation in 19956
In 1995, the Japanese yen moved sharply against the US dollar on two
occasions . On the first of these occasions, from March 1 to April 19, the
yen appreciated against the US dollar by over 15 percent, rising from 96.75
to 81.08 yen per US dollar (Figure 3-A and Figure 3-B). On the second
occasion, from August 1 to September 19, the yen reversed its position
against the US dollar by depreciating by more than 15 percent, declining
from 88.29 to 104.20 yen per US dollar (Figure 4-A and Figure 4-B). These
two periods may be instructive in revealing not only the reaction of the
monetary authorities but also how it might have changed since the 1980s.20
(1) Korea
When the yen fluctuated sharply against the US dollar in either
direction, the Korean authorities initially maintained the won/dollar
exchange rate stable. It appears that a substantial adjustment of the
won/dollar exchange rate takes place only after it is determined that the
movement of the yen against the dollar is significant and more or less of
permanent nature. It is interesting to note that when the yen sharply
depreciated against the dollar from August 14 to August 17 (by as much as 5
percent in 3 days), the Korean authorities inunediately reacted by
depreciating the won (from 761.75 won per US dollar on August 15 to 787.65
won on August 18), indicating the greater weight they assign to a
depreciating yen. It is clear that the depreciation of the Korean won in
August 1995 was deliberate as the balance of foreign exchange reserves were
increasing during this period.
(2) Singapore
When the yen appreciated, the Singaporean authorities allowed the
Singapore dollar to appreciate moderately along with the yen against the US
dollar. When the yen depreciated, however, the authorities kept the nominal
value of the Singapore dollar virtually constant against the US dollar for
two full business weeks before allowing the Singapore dollar to depreciate
moderately in response to a further depreciation of the yen. This may
reflect the importance of price stability in Singapore’s exchange rate
policy, hence the greater resistance to exchange rate depreciation and the
greater propensity to accommodate the yen’s exchange rate appreciation.
(3) Malaysia
On a dally basis, Malaysia’s policy response was quite asyrmnetricwith
respect to the yen’s depreciation and appreciation. When the yen21
appreciated in March 1995, the nominal value of the ringgit remained
extremely stable for most of “the period, although it began to appreciate
moderately against the US dollar during the very last part of the yen’s
appreciation phase. When the yen depreciated in August, however, the
ringgit depreciated immediately against the US dollar so as to offset a
portion of its appreciation against the yen.
(4) Indonesia
The nominal value of the Indonesian rupiah remained fairly constant
against the US dollar on both occasions. In fact, it continued to
depreciate against the US dollar at a moderate pace regardless of the
movement of the yen against the dollar.
(5) Philippines
The behavior of the Philippine peso was similar to that of the
Indonesian rupiah. Regardless of how the yen moved against the US dollar,
the peso remained on a moderately depreciating trend against the dollar.
(6) Thailand
The Thai baht’s movement, was symmetrical with respect to the yen’s
appreciation and depreciation. In both cases, the baht moved so as to
offset a portion of its movement against the yen, indicative of the policy





the yen is a component. Judging from the movement of
reserves (not reported here), it is most likely that the
sold foreign exchange in the market during the period of
(so as to appreciate the baht), while they purchase foreign
exchange during the period of yen depreciation (so as to depreciate the
baht) .22
VII. Conclusion
By looking at how six East Asian currencies moved when the yen
fluctuated sharply against the US dollar during 1580-95, we have found ~hac
the reaction was sometimes much more significant than would be suggested by
the econometric estimates of the yen’s weight in the determination of their
nominal values. When the individual episodes of sharp yen fluctuation were
examined, the “weight” of the yen often appeared larger than most of the
econometric estimates taken from a longer sample period. The exceptions,
however, were the Indonesian rupiah and the Philippine peso, both of which
showed secular depreciation against the US dollar over the period. Clearly,
the paramount objective of the Indonesian and Filipino exchange rate
policies was to prevent a real appreciation of their currencies in the light
of higher domestic inflation by consistently depreciating their currencies
in nominal terms. In these countries, little attention was paid to the
movement of the yen, although it is evident that the yen is prominently
included in the real effective exchange rate indices.
Except for Thailand, which strictly adheres to a basket peg, the other
countries have more recently shown asymmetric responses to the yen’s
depreciation and appreciation. The Korean won and the Malaysian ringgit
have tended to move more closely with a depreciating yen, suggesting the
emphasis placed on export promotion. In this sense, the yen is perceived in
Korea and Malaysia as the currency of a competitor country in the export
market. ‘ On the other hand, the Singapore dollar has tended to move more
closely with an appreciating yen, underscoring the importance the
authorities attach to price stability in the exchange rate policy.
Emphasis on export promotion produces a qore convergent qovement with a
depreciating yen and a qore divergent movement with an appreciating yen.23
Conversely, emphasis on price stability produces a more convergent movement
with an appreciating yen and a more divergent movement with a depreciating
yen. As things have turned out, because the yen showed sustained and
significant appreciation against the US dollar for the sample period as a
whole , an exchange rate policy targeted at price stability has contributed
more to monetary cooperation in Asia by promoting intra-regional exchange
rate stability, than a more competitive exchange rate policy targeted at
export promotion.Shinji Takagi
Footnotes
1. In discussing the role of the yen in Asia, there is also the separate
question of how widely the yen is used in intra-regional transactions. The
emphasis of the paper, however, is strictly on the importance of the yen in
the determination of the nominal values of the East Asian currencies.
2. The term “low and stable domestic inflation” appeared as the official
objective of Singapore’s exchange rate policy for the first time in the 1989
issue of IMF’s annual report on Exchan~e Arrangements and Exchan~e
Restrictions .
3. The reported weights do not necessarily add up to unity because there
may be other currencies or variables included in the estimation equations,
sometimes with a negative weight.
4. Admittedly, this is a crude measure of the weight of the yen because
there can be other currencies whose qovements are being considered by the
authorities . This measure is simply to be taken as a rough indication of
how closely the currency in question moved with the yen ex uost, relative to
the US dollar. As another qualification, it should also be noted that this
measure may underestimate the “weight” of the yen if the currency in
question moves with the yen with a longer lag.
5. The daily exchange rate data were obtained from the Asian Wall Street
Journal. The exchange rates for 1985 are mid rates at 5 p.m. in Hong Kong,
while those for 1989 are selling rates at 3 p.m. in New York.
6. The daily exchange rate data, except for the Indonesian rupiah, were
obtained from the Financial Times. The exchange rates are closing mid rates
in London. The daily data for the rupiah were obtained from the Wall Street
Journal. The exchange rates are selling rates at 3 p.m. in New York.7. Although it is likely that the industrial composition of Korean exports
is similar to that of Japanese exports, it is not clear to what extent
Malaysian exports compete with Japanese exports. The characterization of
the bel-,avior of the Malaysian ~-inggitas “cGmpetiti~-e” relative to tt,eyen
remains only tentative.Shinji Takagi
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